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A CURRENT VIEW OF SOME TAX EFFECTS
IN MORTGAGE FINANCING
Louis A. DEL COTTO t
I. INTRODUCTION
All tax students should be familiar with the general principle that
indebtedness to which property is subject is included for income tax
purposes in its "cost," 1 even though the purchaser does not incur or
assume personal liability for the debt. That the United States Supreme
Court approves this principle is evident from the reasoning in Crane v.
Commissioner,2 and decisions affirming it can be found in both the
federal courts of appeals and the Tax Court of the United States.
3
Crane and the lower court decisions following it also hold that upon
sale of the property, the indebtedness must be included in amount real-
ized for purposes of computing the seller's gain or loss, whether or not
he is personally liable on the debt, and whether the debt is part of the
basis of the property 4 or is excluded therefrom because it was incurred
on a borrowing subsequent to the acquisition of the property."
One new to the area must wonder how there can be "cost" without
investment of some form of economic wealth, or at least commitment
of one's personal credit, and must question how one can "realize" 6 a
debt for ivhich he has no personal obligation 1 If a cost basis can be
acquired without economic investment, it becomes possible to obtain
a tax-free cash flow from depreciation deductions based on "cost"
without ever having to account for all or any of the tax benefits pro-
t Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. LL.B. 1951,
University of Buffalo; LL.M. 1961, Columbia University. Member, New York Bar.
. "Cost" as referred to in this Article is "cost" as defined by INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 1012.
2331 U.S. 1 (1946).
3 See Parker v. Delaney, 186 F,2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926
(1951); Manuel D. Mayerson, 47 T.C. 340 (1966); Blackstone Theatre Co., 12 T.C.
801 (1949).
4 See, e.g., Parker v. Delaney, 186 F2d 455 (lst Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
926 (1951).
6 See, e.g., R. O'Dell & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 169 F2d 247 (3d Cir. 1948);
Woodsam Associates v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Mendhamn Corp.
v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320 (1947).
6 See INT. RJZv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001 (b).
' See Parker v. Delaney, 186 F,2d 455, 459-60 (1st Cir. 1950) (Magruder, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951), where Judge Magruder attempted to
explain "realization," through the concept of a negative basis. The Supreme Court
looked with disfavor on the concept in Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 10 (1946).
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duced by such deductions on disposition of the property. Whether the
result will differ if the disposition is by means of a transfer other than
a sale (such as by gift, testamentary disposition, or abandonment), is
also unclear.'
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue' recently voiced his con-
cern with these problems in Manuel D. Mayerson,'° where he tried
unsuccessfully to prevent a taxpayer fi-om including an unassumed
mortgage in the basis of his property. On the authority of Crane the
Tax Court held that the full amount of the mortgage was the "cost" of
the property. Although the Commissioner later acquiesced in Mayer-
son," nevertheless he warned that the Treasury "will continue to
review transactions . . . designed to improperly create or inflate de-
preciation deductions . . ." and "will disallow unwarranted depreci-
ation deductions." 12
The cause of the Commissioner's alarm is that the investor can
acquire a very large depreciable basis for a comparatively small amount
of money, without incurring personal liability on the mortgage. In
Mayerson, for example, the taxpayer obtained a depreciable basis of
$200,000 for his building for only $10,000 cash and a mortgage note
which did not require periodic amortization of the mortgage or involve
personal liability on the note.' Thus, depreciation deductions taken
on an extremely high basis, often at accelerated rates, not only can
offset income from the property, but may result in losses which can
be applied against other income. 4 Furthermore, although Crane also
requires that the amount of the unamortized mortgage be included in
the amount realized when the property is sold, any gain will generally
be capital gain, 5 whereas past depreciation deductions will have offset
ordinary income. 6
This Article reexamines the Crane decision and the cases following
it, analyzes the implications of those decisions, and recommends alter-
natives to correct the resulting deficiencies and the confused dogma
attributable to them.
8 See Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine; An
Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAx L. REv. 159 (1966).
9The Commissioner of Internal Revenue will hereinafter be referred to as
Commissioner.
1047 T.C. 340 (1966).
"11969 INT. REv. BULL. No. 8, at 6.
12 Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 8, at 10.
.1 Text accompanying notes 18-20 infra.
' 4 See Adams, mspra note 8.
15 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231.
16Text accompanying notes 125-26 infra.
[Vo1.118:69
MORTGAGE FINANCING
II. Crane RE-EXAMINED: SHOULD UNASSUMED DEBT BE
INCLUDED IN "COST"?
Section 1001(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that the
gain from any sale or other disposition of property "shall be the excess
of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis." To make
analysis easier, adjusted basis (as defined by sections 1011 and 1016)
for purposes of this discussion will simply be the "cost" basis provided
for in section 1012 minus any allowable deductions" for exhaustion,
wear and tear, amortization, or depletion.
When property is acquired in exchange for cash or other property
free of encumbrances, the basis of the new property in general is the
cash expended or the value of the property surrendered. These amounts
are relatively simple to compute. Similarly, when property is acquired
in exchange for a promise to pay or a note enforceable against the
maker, the face amount of the promise or note is treated in the same
manner as if a cash payment had been made. However, if there is no
personal liability on the part of the maker of a note, it is questionable
whether the debt is part of the cost of acquisition, and hence part of
basis. For example, in Mayerson,'8 the taxpayer financed a real estate
purchase by executing a purchase money note in the face amount of
$332,500, secured by a mortgage. The note provided that, except for
$10,000 payable immediately, the obligation was not due for ninety-nine
years, and that in case of default the mortgagee's sole recourse was
against the property. Although the Commissioner contended that the
taxpayer acquired only a ninety-nine year leasehold interest in the
property, and therefore should only be entitled to depreciate the $10,000
"cost" of this interest,"9 the Tax Court held that the taxpayer had pur-
chased, rather than leased, the property, and could depreciate it on a
"cost" basis of $332,500 (the face amount of the mortgage). Since
the court cited Crane 20 as authority, it is necessary to examine the
principles which the Supreme Court established in that case for deter-
mining basis under the relevant sections of the Internal Revenue Code.
The taxpayer in Crane received as part of her inheritance under
her husband's will real estate valued at $262,042.50, which was the
exact amount of the mortgage and interest in default encumbering the
property."- Later, she sold the property (still subject to the mortgage)
for $25,000 net, and reported a taxable gain of only $1,250, on the
17INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1016, provides that basis must be adjusted for
"allowable" depreciation, even though the taxpayer may not have taken the deduction.
1847 T.C. 340 (1966).
TD Id. at 349.
20 Id. at 351.
21331 U.S. at 3-4.
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theory that the "property" which she had acquired by devise was only
the equity which her husband possessed in the property, or the excess
of the value of the lot and building over the mortgage, which was zero.'
The Commissioner maintained that the property acquired and sold
was not the equity, but was the physical property itself. Because the
Court thought the property had not been acquired by purchase, it did
not deal with section 1012, as the Mayerson court did. It dealt with
what is now section 1014, which defines the basis of property acquired
from a decedent. This section provides that the basis of inherited
property is the fair market value at the time of the decedent's death.
Holding that this meant the fair market value of the property un-
diminished by the mortgage, and not merely the taxpayer's equity in the
property, the Court expressed three policy reasons for its decision.
First, it relied on the dictionary definition of property and admin-
istrative construction of the statute, commenting that revenue acts
should be interpreted in their ordinary, everyday sense.2 4 Since the
dictionary had no difficulty in distinguishing "property" from "equity,"
and since neither Congress nor the Treasury used the terms inter-
changeably,25 the Court concluded that "equity" was not synonomous
with "property," and that the dictionary definition of "property" was
controlling.
Next, the Court reasoned that if "property" were construed to
mean "equity," the construction would wreak havoc with the statutory
provision for depreciation,26 because depreciation would have to be
computed on the basis of a shifting equity, that is, on the taxpayer's
original economic investment plus any amounts that he later paid to
amortize the mortgage.17  This would distort income, because in the
early years of the property's life the depreciation allowance would be
only a fraction of the amount of the physical exhaustion of the property,
and in later years the allowance would presumably exceed the actual
amount of exhaustion.28 Furthermore, the shifting equity basis would
not only allow the mortgagor to control the timing of his depreciation
allowances, but would also create an intolerable accounting burden.
Finally, the Court expressed a concern that avoiding the problems
of a shifting equity basis by allowing depreciation on the full value of




23Section 113(a) (5), Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 289, 52 Stat. 490, remains sub-
stantially unchanged as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014.
24331 U.S. at 6.
251d. at 8.
26See INT. IEv. CODE OF 1954, § 167; text accompanying note 135 infra.




loss of the deduction or a sub-zero basis. The Court hinted that it found
a negative basis objectionable.
In light of the rationale of the Court in Crane, the Tax Court was
clearly correct in Mayerson, ° holding that the face amount of the mort-
gage was part of the basis, since Congress presumably intended the
same definition of property to apply throughout the Internal Revenue
Code, and since the same problems of a shifting basis that worried the
Court in Crane would also exist in the Mayerson situation if only equity
were included in basis. Therefore, the authority for Mayerson is un-
assailable. But the rationale-the Crane doctrine-underlying that
authority is subject to attack.
Resort to the dictionary could perhaps be forgiven, since the prob-
lem, if it does not boggle the mind, at least on first exposure appears
somewhat unmanageable. Yet, careful consideration of the precise issue
in Crane exposes the inadequacy of the dictionary definition of property.
The precise question was not the meaning of the word "property" alone,
but of all the relevant statutory language: "property acquired by . . .
devise." The value of the real estate as appraised for estate tax pur-
poses was identical to the sum of the mortgage plus the interest in de-
fault on the date of death. Because the taxpayer could not acquire free
of the mortgage lien any part of the property value without first paying
off a portion of the mortgage, the value of the property acquired by
devise necessarily was zero. It is a strange inheritance that must be
purchased! Even an everyday construction of the statute would lead
one to conclude that the taxpayer inherited no property interest, and
that no such interest could be acquired except by payments amortizing
the mortgage. Payments would then provide a "cost" basis for the
property.
The rationale of Crane leads to the same result as including the
mortgage in cost, but results would vary in other situations. Thus,
suppose that in Crane the value of the property had been somewhat
less than the amount of the mortgage debt. The Court apparently would
disregard the mortgage and give a fair market value basis, even though
to acquire a clear title to the property the devisee would have to pay an
amount larger than the value of the property in order to discharge the
mortgage. In such a case there is no reason to deny a "cost" basis in
the amount of the mortgage.
A further example of the unfortunate results that the Crane defini-
tion of property produces is the situation in which a taxpayer acquires
property worth $150,000 and subject to a $50,000 mortgage, in ex-
291d. at 10.
30 Other cases have reached an identical result. See Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d
455 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951); Blackstone Theatre Co., 12
T.C. 801 (1949). See also Rev. Rul. 55-675, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 567.
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change for his unmortgaged property worth $100,000 in which his basis
is $40,000. His gain should be only $60,000, the difference between
the net value of the property received and his basis in the property which
he exchanged for it. But, under the rationale of Crane, the word
"property" in section 1001(b) connotes the property itself and not
merely the equity therein, so that the amount realized is $150,000,
rather than $100,000 as it should be, and the gain is $110,000, a
patently ridiculous result.8 '
The controlling force behind the Court's decision in Crane was
probably its concern for depreciation policy. Section 167 (g) of the
Internal Revenue Code provides that the basis for purposes of depreci-
ation is the same as provided in section 1011 for determining gain or
loss on a sale or other disposition of property. Therefore, if the debt
were not included in the "cost" basis, the basis for depreciation would
be limited to the mortgagor's equity, a result the Court found unaccept-
able. 2  On the other hand, the Court could not bring itself to allow
depreciation on the full amount of the mortgage, which depreciation
would be subtracted from the equity basis, resulting in many cases in a
negative basis.3
If the owner of mortgaged property is to be allowed depreciation
representing the true value of the physical exhaustion of his property,
the rule of Crane appears to be as good as or better than any other.
It is questionable however, whether such depreciation allowances should
be allowed to all mortgagors. In Crane the taxpayer argued that she
was not entitled to depreciation deductions, whatever the basis of the
property, because in the case of an unassumed mortgage, it is the mort-
31 Surrey and Warren suggest that this result can be avoided by adding the
mortgage to the basis in the property exchanged by the taxpayer. This is undoubtedly
wrong, since the mortgage will be part of the cost only of the property received, not
of that exchanged. See S. SuaRE & W. WARREN, FEDERAl. INcOME TAXATION 646
(1960 ed.).
32 331 U.S. at 9.
33 The Tax Court had also rejected the concept of a negative basis. Beulah B.
Crane, 3 T.C. 585, 591 (1944). Its position was apparently shared by the Treasury.
See Surrey, Assumption of Indebtedness in Tax-Free Exchanges, 50 YALE L.J. 1, 19
(1940); Cooper, Negative Basis, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1352, 1353 n.4 (1962). However,
a negative basis was supported by the concurring opinion of Judge Magruder in
Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 459-60 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926
(1951), and the position of the Tax Court was eventually reversed and a negative
basis allowed in Easson v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961), reversing
33 T.C. 963 (1960). In Easson the Tax Court held that a taxpayer who transferred
real estate subject to a mortgage in excess of his basis to a newly formed corporation
in exchange for all its stock was taxable on the excess in order to avoid a basis
adjustment below zero under what are now §§ 358(a) & 358(d) of the INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954. 33 T.C. at 970. But the Ninth Circuit reversed and approved the negative
basis. 294 F.2d at 658. When it enacted the 1954 Code, Congress disapproved the
negative basis by introducing § 357(c) which resolves the Easson problem in accord
with the Tax Court's solution. For further evidence of Congressional disapproval
of negative basis see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 362(c) (2); Treas. Reg. § 1.362-2(b)
(1955) ; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301(c), 1021. See generally, Cooper, Negative
Basis, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1352 (1962).
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gagee, not the mortgagor, who will bear any economic loss. She
reasoned that the one who bears the risk of economic loss should be
the person who is entitled to take depreciation deductions. The Court
disposed of this argument by noting that the value of the property never
fell below the amount of the mortgage lien2 4 (suggesting that the
mortgagor could reasonably be expected to pay off the mortgage and
bear any loss that might result). It concluded that so long as the mort-
gagor remains in possession, the mortgagee cannot take depreciation
deductions since the property is not being used in the mortgagee's trade
or business.35 The Court could have added that the scheme of the Code
was to allow the mortgagee to deduct his economic loss either as a bad
debt under section 166, or as a loss under section 165.
Thus, the crux of the decision is the reasoning that where the
value of the property exceeds the amount of the mortgage lien, the
mortgagor could be expected to amortize the mortgage in order to re-
tain the land:
[A] n owner of property, mortgaged at a figure less than that
at which the property will sell, must and will treat the condi-
tions of the mortgage exactly as if they were his personal
obligations3 6
Indeed, the discussion of the problems in determining a proper de-
preciation allowance that a shifting equity would create is superfluous
unless the Court had in fact made the judgment that economic cost
would actually be incurred by the mortgagor.
When the Tax Court was faced with Mayerson, it could find no
reason to treat a taxpayer purchasing by mortgage differently from
one who had acquired property by devise, or from one who had paid
cash for the property. The Tax Court, untroubled about the lack of
personal liability (like the Supreme Court in Crane), stated:
The element of the lack of personal liability has little real
significance due to common business practices. As we have in-
dicated in our findings it is not at all unusual in current
mortgage financing of income-producing properties to limit
liability to the property involved. Taxpayers who are not
personally liable for encumbrances on property should be al-
lowed depreciation deductions affording competitive equality
with taxpayers who are personally liable for encumbrances or
taxpayers who own unencumbered property. The effect of
such a policy is to give the taxpayer an advance credit for the
amount of the mortgage. This appears to be reasonable since
34 331 U.S. at 11-12.
35Id. at 10 n.28. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a).
36 331 U.S. at 14 (footnote omitted).
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it can be assumed that a capital investment in the amount of
the mortgage will eventually occur despite the absence of per-
sonal liability. The respondent has not suggested any
rationale that would reasonably require a contrary conclusion.
The lien created by the purchase-money mortgage, like the
tax liens in the Blackstone Theatre case, should be included in
basis for the purpose of computing depreciation
3 7
In the usual case where a mortgage calls for amortization pay-
ments, an assumption that an investment in the amount of the mortgage
will eventually occur may be warranted. The language of the court in
Mayerson might be correct in such a case. But the Mayerson court
was so concerned with the general rule that it failed to recognize the
crucial difference between Mayerson and Crane. In Mayerson, no pay-
ments beyond the initial $10,000 were due for ninety-nine years; there-
fore there was a much greater doubt than in Crane that the mortgage
would be paid. To give advance credit for the amount of the mortgage
when there is such uncertainty that the mortgage would be paid can only
be viewed as an extreme application of the Crane doctrine. Nevertheless,
perhaps it is proper for reasons of depreciation policy-the point stressed
by the Tax Court. In any event, the Commissioner acquiesced in the
decision,"8 although he stressed the "bona fides" of the transaction 39
and noted that the fair market value of the property was not in issue,
warning that depreciation allowances will be disallowed when "unwar-
ranted." 4 In the business motivated transaction, the Crane rule-re-
quiring inclusion of the mortgage in basis-should be continued to
prevent a distortion of annual depreciation allowances.
A. Cancellation of Indebtedness Aspects of the Crane Rule: Settlement
of the Mortgage Debt at Less Than Face Amount
When a debtor negotiates with his creditor for settlement of the
debt at a discount, a question arises whether the debtor realizes income
due to the cancellation of indebtedness. In United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co. "' the taxpayer issued bonds at par and later purchased
them back in the open market at a discount. The amount of the dis-
count was held to be income, because the taxpayer received economic
gain since its assets were freed of the offset of the debt in the amount
of the cancellation.
3747 T.C. at 351-52.
88 1969 IwT. REv. BuLL. No. 8, at 6.
8 9 Text accompanying note 8 supra.
4oRev. Rul. 69-77, 1969 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 8, at 10.
41284 U.S. 1 (1931).
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Kirby Lumber Co. has been followed by the Court in similar
cases.' It has not been followed, however, where the taxpayer is not
personally liable on the debt.43 For example, in Fulton Gold Corp.,44
in which the taxpayer satisfied a real estate mortgage at a discount, the
Tax Court held that because there was no personal liability on the mort-
gage debt, the discount did not free any assets of the taxpayer. The
Court reasoned that the use of the assets had not been restricted before
the discount, and therefore the cancellation of indebtedness was not such
an economic benefit that produced income under Kirby Lumber. The
proper tax treatment of the discount was to treat it as a downward
adjustment to the cost of the mortgaged property.
Even when the debtor is personally liable, some courts have held
that there is no income if the debtor negotiates with his creditor to ob-
tain a reduction of an asset's purchase price where the value of the asset
has declined by at least the amount of debt cancelled. Instead, the trans-
action is treated as an adjustment of the purchase price, and the basis of
the asset is reduced by the amount of debt cancelled. 6 But where there
is no shrinkage in the value of the asset, the Treasury has ruled that a
reduction in indebtedness produces income.
4 7
This distinction is erroneous. To allow a reduction of the pur-
chase price in lieu of finding income is improper if the taxpayer is
personally liable, even though the asset has shrunk in value. Freeing
otherwise committed assets produces income. When liability is can-
celled, whether by purchase of notes at a discount in the open market,
or by a reduction in the purchase price of an asset, assets are freed and
income is therefore produced. Indeed, income was found in Fifth
Avenue-Fourteenth Street Corp. v. Commissioner,4s where a mort-
gagor personally liable on the mortgage was able to buy mortgage
certificates at a discount and use them at face value to discharge its
mortgage debt. Although the case is distinguishable because nego-
tiations for the discount did not relate to the purchase price, nonetheless
42 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949) ; Helvering v. American
Chicle Co., 291 U.S. 426 (1934).
43 See, e.g., Fulton Gold Corp., 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934); P. J. Hiatt, 35
B.T.A. 292 (1937) ; Hotel Astoria, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 759 (1940) ; Brighton Recreations,
Inc., 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 135 (1961).
4431 B.T.A. 519 (1934).
45 Id. at 520.
4 6 Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 1940); Helvering v.
A. L. Killian Co., 128 F2d 433, 434-35 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Commissioner v. Sherman,
135 F.2d 68, 70 (6th Cir. 1943) ; Ahrens Publishing Co., Inc., 1 T.C. 345, 354 (1942) ;
Charles L. Nutter, 7 T.C. 480, 483 (1946). But see L. D. Codden & Bros., 37 B.T.A.
393, 397-99 (1938).
47 I.T. 4018, 1950-2 Cum. BuLL. 20.
48 147 F2d 453 (2d Cir. 1944).
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Judge Frank termed "irrational" the reduction of purchase price
distinction.49
Allowing a reduction of the purchase price creates a serious prob-
lem when cancellation occurs after the taxpayer has already benefited
from deductions based upon the unreduced cost of the property. In
Blackstone Theatre Co.,5 ° for example, the taxpayer acquired real es-
tate subject to tax liens of approximately $120,000 and was able to
discharge the liens five years later for about $50,000. The Commis-
sioner contended that the taxpayer's basis for depreciation was limited
to the amount eventually paid on the liens, not the total amount of the
encumbrances ($50,000 rather than $120,000). He argued that this
adjustment to basis should be made retroactively in order to disallow
depreciation deductions on a basis of more than $50,000. The Tax
Court held that under Crane the basis for depreciation included the full
amount of the liens ($120,000) and this basis could not be retroactively
reduced. The result is consistent with Mayerson " where the court held
that the taxpayer's basis for depreciation in the years prior to the dis-
charge included the full mortgage debt unaffected by a subsequent
settlement at less than the face amount. 2
Although it may appear that taxpayers are given a windfall when
they are allowed to reduce the amount of outstanding debt by a reduc-
tion in the purchase price without realizing income, after depreciating
the property on the face amount of the debt, the windfall may be illu-
sory. For instance, in B. F. Avery & Sons, Inc.,5 3 the taxpayer pur-
chased merchandise and manufacturing equipment partially on credit.
When the merchandise was sold, its cost was deducted as part of the
cost of goods; while the machinery was used, depreciation deductions
were made. Ten years later the taxpayer obtained a cancellation of
part of the debt remaining. Because the cost of merchandise and de-
preciation expense had already been deducted, the taxpayer had to treat
the amount of the notes cancelled as income. The court noted that if
cancellation of the debt had taken place in the same year as the purchase
[t]he adjustment necessitated by the note cancellation probably
would have been accomplished by eliminating the basis for
depreciation and loss on the manufacturing machinery and
reducing inventory and cost of goods sold."4
49 Id. at 457. The distinction was also rejected in Commissioner v. Coastwise
Transp. Corp., 71 F2d 104, 106 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 293 U.S. 595 (1934).
,5 12 T.C. 801 (1949).
5147 T.C. 340 (1966). See text accompanying notes 18-21 Mtpra for a discussion
of the relevant facts.
m Id. at 354.
326 B.T.A. 1393 (1932).
5
4 Id. at 1399.
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However, the court noted that the transactions did not take place in a
single year but were spread over ten years. Therefore, relying on
Kirby Lumber and "tax benefit" principles the court held that in the
tenth year it was necessary to include the amount of the cancellation as
income in order to offset prior deductions." Thus, although the prior
depreciation taken on the inflated price of the property cannot be re-
computed, the excess amounts of the depreciation are taken into income
in the year the debt is cancelled. Except for changes in yearly tax rates
or vicissitudes in the profits of the taxpayer, the result is substantially
the same.
B. Contingent Obligations as Part of Cost
An obligation cannot be included as part of the basis of property
if it is contingent or indefinite in nature." In Lloyd H. Redford," for
example, a note given as part payment on the purchase of property was
excluded from the basis of the property since it was payable from future
profits only. Whether or not there would be any future profits was
uncertain. Actually, by the time of the litigation, the uncertainty had
been considerably reduced since profits had been returned, but had not
yet been applied against the note. Nevertheless, the court held that the
obligation could not be included in basis. Retrospective analysis did
not change the fact that uncertainty existed at the time of acquisition.
An identical result was reached in Albany Car Wheel Co."" The
taxpayer purchased certain business assets with $15,000 in notes
and assumed specified liabilities of about $75,000, plus an obligation
for severance pay to the seller's employees under a union contract. The
Commissioner and the taxpayer agreed that the notes and $75,000
liability were part of basis, but the Commissioner rejected the taxpayer's
claim that $50,000 (the alleged severance pay liability) was also in-
cludable.
The court upheld the Commissioner on two grounds. First, no
fixed sum of $50,000 could be set, because the liability was dependent
upon the number of employees at the time of closing the plant. There
would be no liability to those who died or left the taxpayer's employ in
the meantime. More important, the court emphasized that the taxpayer
had obtained a release from the obligations of the union contract and
had negotiated a new agreement with the union under which he was
relieved of liability for severance pay if the employees were given notice
.55 Id. at 1400.
56Albany Car Wheel Co., 40 T.C. 831 (1963), aff'd per curiam, 333 F2d 653
(2d Cir. 1964) ; Columbus Greenville Ry. Co., 42 T.C. 834 (1964) ; Lloyd H. Redford,
28 T.C. 773 (1957); Rev. Rul. 55-675, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 567.
5728 T.C. 773 (1957).
58 40 T.C. 831 (1963), aff'd per curiam, 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964).
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for specified periods (six to twelve weeks depending upon the length of
prior service) before the plant was closed.
The court recognized that there could have been liability for
severance pay, if, for example, the plant had burned, leaving the em-
ployees without work before they received the required notice. But
the court reasoned that the taxpayer was protected against this con-
tingency by fire insurance, the premiums of which were a deductible
business expense, and it concluded:
We think that petitioner's liability for severance pay . . . was
so speculative that its obligations under the union contract
cannot fairly be regarded as part of the "cost" of the assets
acquired. . . . To the extent that any liability might accrue
in a later year as a result of that contract, payments thereunder
may properly be taken into account at such later time; they
may not be used to increase the cost of goods sold in an earlier
year or to increase the amount of the depreciation allowance
for such earlier year."O
In Mayerson the face amount of the mortgage ($332,500) was to
be reduced if it were paid off in either the first or second year following
purchase, to $275,000 or $298,750, respectively.6" No prepayment oc-
curred, but the purchase money obligation was in fact settled some
years later for $200,000. Rejecting the Commissioner's argument that
the entire obligation was too indefinite to be included in basis,6 the
court held that the taxpayers' basis was the full $332,500. No reasons
were given for the decision, but the court characterized the price reduc-
tion terms as a "bonus discount," 62 which "merely provided an incen-
tive for very early retirement of the mortgage which did not occur." 63
"Bonus discount" is a label signifying nothing. Satisfied with
verbal distinctions, the court chose not to grapple with the concept of
contingency. A discount for prepayment by its very nature makes the
price indefinite and to some extent contingent on future events. The
Commissioner may have gone too far in excluding even the reduced
price from basis, but it is clear that any obligation in excess of the re-
duced price is contingent. Although the decision pays lip service to it,
this case disregards the "contingent and indefinite" rule and is incon-
sistent with Redford and Albany Car Wheel. The Mayerson court did
69 Id. at 841. The court did not state whether future payments were to be
expended or capitalized.
'O This reduction did not represent any interest since the mortgage required annual
payments of interest at the market rate. 47 T.C. at 342.
61 Id. at 353-54. The Commissioner used the argument that the obligation was
excessively indefinite to bolster the claim that there was in reality no debt but only
the establishment of a leasehold. Id. at 349-50. Text accompanying notes 6-11 .Mtpra.




note, however, that prepayment had not in fact occurred. In both
Redford 04 and Albany Car Wheel '5 the courts also mentioned that the
taxpayer never paid the contingent amount. Emerging from these
cases is a rule of retrospective analysis rather than a reasoned approach
to the problem of contingent obligations.
Whether to include a contingent obligation in basis is a problem
different only in degree from the general problem of whether noncon-
tingent liability should be included in cost. The rationale for inclusion
of the latter is premised on the notion that eventually it will be paid,
either because the taxpayer is personally liable or because he must dis-
charge the obligation in order to keep the property." If the obligation
consists of a long-term mortgage, the possibility is often remote that
the debt will be entirely discharged before the property is sold. In this
sense the mortgage obligation is contingent, but it is nevertheless in-
cluded in basis. An adjustment is made for the unamortized portion
of the mortgage by adding it to the amount realized on sale. No ex-
planation has been given for the distinction drawn between these cases
and Redford, where the possibility of an increase in cost based on future
profits was excluded from basis. In both situations inclusion of the
liability in basis can be offset by inclusion of the unamortized portion
in the amount realized on sale. Although the adjustment to amount
realized may alone be inadequate to prevent an unwarranted tax bene-
fit,67 the solution is just as appropriate in Redford as in Crane and
Parker v. Delaney." In Crane, no part of the mortgage was amortized
during the six years the property was held by the taxpayer, and in
Parker v. Delaney, only $14,000 of a $273,000 mortgage was amortized
over the approximately ten-year period before the property was conveyed
to the mortgagee. In both cases allowable depreciation exceeded
amortization payments. If proper depreciation policy requires inclusion
in basis of the mortgage obligations in Crane and Parker v. Delaney,
it must require as much of the contingent note in Redford, since its
payment is no more contingent than full payment of the mortgage in
64 28 T.C. at 778.
65 40 T.C. at 840.
66
Taxpayers who are not personally liable for encumbrances on property should
be allowed depreciation deductions affording competitive equality with tax-
payers who are personally liable for encumbrances or taxpayers who own
unencumbered property. The effect of such a policy is to give the taxpayer
an advance credit for the amount of the mortgage. This appears to be
reasonable since it can be assumed that a capital investment in the amount
of the mortgage will eventually occur despite the absence of personal liability.
Manuel D. Mayerson, 47 T.C. 340, 352 (1966) (emphasis added).
67 Text accompanying note 125 infra.
63 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950). For further remarks on Parker v. Delaney see
text accompanying note 107 infra.
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the former cases. Such treatment would also make Redford consistent
with Mayerson.69  However, such consistency may in some cases be
improper.
Judicial opinions on the subject normally begin in the same manner
as did this section of the Article-with the postulate that contingent
obligations are not included in basis. Gradually, courts avoided appli-
cation of the rule in cases where there were obvious contingencies.7"
If exceptions are not to swallow the rule, remote contingent obligations
must be excluded from basis. In Mayerson the taxpayers had all the
benefits of absolute ownership without assuming personal liability on
the mortgage. Exempt from required payments for ninety-nine years,
the taxpayer could obtain nothing through amortization that he did not
already possess. Therefore, amortization was not only contingent; it
was highly unlikely. Once the court concluded that the mortgage was
part of basis, it decided, probably correctly, that the possibility of pre-
payment in the first two years was so remote that the basis could not be
reduced below the face amount of the mortgage. Similarly, if the court
finds, as it did in Redford and Albany Car Wheel, that there is only a
remote chance of expenditure, basis should not be expanded to include
this contingency.
III. Crane REEXAMINED: SHOULD UNASSUMED DEBT BE INCLUDED
IN AMOUNT REALIZED?
Section 1002 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that on the
sale or exchange of property the entire amount of the gain shall be
recognized. Gain is defined in section 1001 as the excess of the amount
realized over the adjusted basis; "' amount realized includes the fair
market value of property received. Eisner v. Macomber 2 established
the concept that "realization" of the gain is a prerequisite to imposition
of the income tax, although later cases indicate that the court is zealous
in finding realization has occurred.7" Since United States v. Hendler 74
it is clear that the assumption of a debt is treated just as if money were
actually paid to the person whose obligation is assumed. The taxpayer
whose debt is assumed therefore realizes a gain to the extent that the
debt exceeds basis. Hendler involved a reorganization in which a cor-
porate taxpayer transferred its assets in return for consideration that
69 See note 66 supra.
70 E.g., Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
926 (1951); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1946).
71 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001. Text accompanying note 17 supra.
72252 U.S. 189 (1920). Whether or not the doctrine of realization is constitu-
tionally required or is simply part of the congressional scheme has been the subject
of much debate. See Lowndes, Current Conceptions of Taxable Income, 25 OHIO ST.
LJ. 151, 171-72 (1964).
73 See, e.g., Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
74 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
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included assumption of its bonded indebtedness by the transferee.
Therefore, the gain realized was taxable to the extent of the debt. Al-
though there is some ambiguity in the court's reasoning that the trans-
action was identical to the transferor receiving money and then paying
creditors, nevertheless Hendler is generally read as establishing that
the assumption of the debt, rather than the payment, is equivalent to
receipt of money by the debtor.75 This principle is now embodied in
the Code.7
In Crane, the Court faced the question whether the taxpayer real-
ized a gain when she sold property for cash subject to a mortgage on
which neither she nor the buyer was personally liable. The seller con-
ceded that if she were personally liable on the mortgage, and the pur-
chaser assumed her liability, the amount of the mortgage would have
been part of her amount realized. In spite of the lack of personal lia-
bility of either the vendor or vendee, the Court held on two separate
grounds that the amount of the mortgage was realized by the seller.
First, the Court noted that the word "property" in section
1001 (b)"7 must be construed in the same way as in the basis provisions
of the Code.7" This is necessary, said the Court, because "the functional
relation of the two sections requires that the word mean the same in
one section that it does in the other." " In other words the Court
believed that the inclusion of a mortgage in basis for depreciation pur-
poses required an offsetting inclusion in amount realized to prevent the
taxpayer from receiving depreciation tax benefits without economic
cost. The Court did not express the idea quite so succinctly, but later
in its opinion when it dealt with the taxpayer's contention that she was
being taxed on something other than income as defined by the sixteenth
amendment, the Court noted that the taxpayer had taken the depreci-
ation deductions to which she was entitled, and concluded, "The crux
of this case, really, is whether the law permits her to exclude allowable
deductions from consideration in computing gain." 8 By holding that
the taxpayer must include the unamortized mortgage in the amount
realized, the Court prevented the taxpayer from obtaining any benefit
from the absence of personal liability, since any depreciation allowable
75 See Surrey, Assumption of Indebtedness in Tax-Free Exchanges, 50 YALE
L.J. 1 (1940).
76See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1031(d), 357(c), 358(d).
77 IT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001 (b) is identical in all pertinent respects with
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 289, § 111(b), 52 Stat. 447 (1938), which was the
applicable section when Crane was decided.
78 Text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
79 331 U.S. at 12.
so Id. at 15.
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during the period in which the taxpayer holds the property reduces the
basis of the property below the amount of the unamortized mortgage,
resulting in inclusion of the amount of this depreciation in income when
the property is sold."'
The second line of reasoning used by the Court is more trouble-
some, especially since it was not essential to the decision. As the
rationale for applying Hendler, the Court stated that a sale of property
subject to a mortgage for which there is no personal liability gives the
seller a "benefit" in the amount of the mortgage which is "as real and
substantial as if the mortgage was discharged, or as if a personal debt
in an equal amount had been assumed by another." 82 To support this
statement, the Court noted that "[A]n owner of property, mortgaged
at a figure less than that at which the property will sell, must and will
treat the conditions of the mortgage as if they were his personal
obligations." 8
To state this concept more clearly, one can say that as long as the
property value is not less than the face amount of the mortgage securing
it, the lien of the mortgagee on the property is tantamount to the im-
position of personal liability on the mortgagor, because his property
can be taken to satisfy the lien. In effect, the mortgagee is simply a
preferred creditor of the mortgagor. When the debt follows the prop-
erty into the hands of a buyer, the mortgagor is relieved of a liability
and realizes a benefit in the amount of the mortgage.
Persuasive though this theory may be in the context of Crane, it
creates a problem in treating a sale by the mortgagor when the value
of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage debt at the time
of the sale. The Court was aware of the problem:
81 Underlying this rationale is the principle of tax benefit; that is, in the year in
which he disposes of property, a taxpayer must include in income any deductions made
in a prior year that later prove to have been unwarrranted. Perry v. United States,
160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cf. 1958), overruled, Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United
States, 381 F2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 111, and Treas. Reg.
§ 1.111-1 (a) incorporate the tax benefit principle into current tax law. Under § 111,
bad debts, prior taxes, or delinquency amounts written off in prior years must be
included in income when recovered, unless the prior deduction did not reduce the tax.
When depreciation is involved, a more stringent rule is applied. Section 1016
requires that the basis of property be reduced by the amount of depreciation allow-
able, whether or not it is taken. Whereas the tax benefit rule is designed to prevent
the taxpayer from making a personal gain through unwarranted deductions, § 1016
is more than a protective device, since it operates regardless of whether there has
been a tax benefit via a deduction. See, e.g., Virginia Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319
U.S. 523 (1943). Therefore, in Crane the taxpayer's basis would have been reduced
by the amount allowable even if she had made no depreciation deduction. However,
this is not a problem unique to Crane. It is a derivative of the fundamental principle
that depreciation deductions should not be manipulated by the taxpayer. See Com-
missioner v. Kennedy Laundry Co., 133 F2d 660 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
770 (1943).




Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount
of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable
cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently,
a different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor
abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mort-
gage without receiving boot. That is not this case.
4
To the extent that the amount of the mortgage exceeds the value of the
property, no property of a mortgagor not personally liable could be used
to satisfy the mortgage. Thus the taxpayer would get no "benefit" to
this extent from disposition of the property subject to the mortgage.
If the "economic benefit" theory is to be applied consistently, no gain is
realized in this amount.
This is the dilemma of Crane. Consistent application of a theory
of "economic benefit" limits the amount of the mortgage that is realized,
while the other discernible rationale of Crane-based on a theory of
"tax benefit"-requires inclusion in amount realized of the full amount
of the mortgage irrespective of the property's value. To resolve the
dilemma, one must reconsider the Court's preoccupation with depreci-
ation policy. Because the mortgage is included in basis, under the
theory of economic benefit, a decline in the value of the property at a
rate faster than the amortization of the mortgage could result in tax-free
income to the taxpayer by way of the depreciation deductions that were
taken on that portion of the property value equivalent to the difference
between the value of the property at the time of its sale, and the amount
of the unamortized mortgage. Therefore, the amount realized on the
sale of the property should not be reduced by this amount. Admittedly,
there is no relief from liability on this amount where there is no per-
sonal liability on the mortgage. In this sense, there is no economic
benefit. But the amount must nevertheless be included in the amount
realized under the principle of tax benefit. In this manner the taxpayer
is made to account for depreciation allowable without economic in-
vestment.
That the amount realized on a sale includes any mortgage to which
the property is subject, irrespective of personal liability, is a rule uni-
formly followed-sometimes on the theory of economic benefit,"5 and
sometimes on the tax benefit theory. 6 Although taxpayers have tried
to avoid the result suggested above in cases where the value of the
property at the time of sale is exceeded by the amount of the mortgage,
84 d. at 14 n.37. See also id. at 15 n.42.
85 E.g., Titelbaum v. Commissioner, 346 12d 266 (7th Cir. 1965) ; Commissioner
v. Fortree Properties, Inc., 211 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1954).
SE.g., Mendham Corp. 9 T.C. 320 (1947).
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no court has yet accepted the argument that consistent application of the
economic benefit principle requires that case to be treated differently.'r
In many cases the mortgage on the property is the result of a bor-
rowing made some time after the property is acquired. When such prop-
erty is sold, the amount of the mortgage is still included in the amount
realized even though it was not part of the cost of the property " but
rather is the cost only of the money borrowed subsequent to the ac-
quisition of the property. Here, it is a variant of the economic benefit
theory that supports inclusion of such a mortgage in the amount realized.
Excluded from cost, the mortgage debt does not give rise to depreci-
ation deductions and cannot be included in amount realized on tax
benefit grounds. But the mortgage must be included in amount realized
to make the taxpayer account for the past borrowing represented by
the mortgage for which the taxpayer is no longer effectively liable.
Otherwise, the borrowing, followed by a sale of the property subject to
the mortgage, to the extent it is not offset by basis would give tax-free
gain to the taxpayer in the sum of the cash received on the borrowing
and not repaid at the time of sale. And since the economic benefit is
represented by that cash, a court should not allow a decline in property
value to reduce the amount realized below the amount of the mortgage. 9
From a slightly different angle, borrowing on the value of property
after acquiring ownership can be viewed as returning to the taxpayer
pro tanto his original economic investment. Looked at this way, the
taxpayer has an investment of zero dollars. He therefore would have
a depreciable basis without economic investment. Thus, when he sells
the property, he must recognize the amount of the mortgage under the
tax benefit theory." However, this theory is inapplicable when the
borrowing represents appreciation on the property for which there was
no prior investment. In such case, the economic benefit theory provides
the only rationale for including the mortgage in amount realized.
87In Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
926 (1951), the court rejected this argument by the taxpayer, presumably because it
was bound by the district Tax Court's finding that the value of the property was at
least equal to the mortgages. Id. at 458. A similar argument was made by the
taxpayer in Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
But the court said, "However, the petitioner has disclaimed reliance upon that and, we
think, advisedly so. Cf. Parker v. Delaney . . ." Id. at 358 n.1.
Prior to Crane, the Tax Court had held in Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 T.C. 682
(1943) that the full amount of a mortgage on which there was no personal liability
was realized despite the fact that the value of the property was exceeded greatly by
the amount of the mortgage. Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 311(c) with id.,
§ 358 (d).
88 Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952); P_
O'Dell & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 169 F2d 247 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Mendham Corp.,
9 T.C. 320 (1947); Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
89 See Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
90 The theory is discussed at text accompanying notes 77-81 supra. See also
Mendham Corp., 9 T.C. 320 (1947).
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A. The Influence Upon Amount Realized of the Cancellation of
Indebtedness Doctrine
When mortgaged property is transferred in return for a cancella-
tion of the debt, the courts, as illustrated above, may tax as income the
difference between the indebtedness and the taxpayer's basis. Once
having found that there is income, the courts do not bother to divide
this income into classes. It makes no difference that one portion may
represent gain or loss from the disposition oi the property and another
segment gain from cancellation of indebtedness." To illustrate, suppose
a taxpayer who is personally liable on a mortgage of $100 has a basis
of $80 in property worth $90 when transferred in discharge of the
mortgage. A court would treat the transaction as a sale and would
tax him on $20 gain from the sale of the property. 2 Properly treated,
however, the transaction should be broken down into two separate com-
ponents of gain. The gain from the sale is only $10, the difference
between basis and value of the property. The remaining $10 is income
from cancellation of the debt, 3 under Kirby Lumber. If the property
were worth $80 and taxpayer's basis were $90, a conveyance in dis-
charge of a mortgage of $100 gives rise to a loss from the sale of $10,
and debt cancellation income of $20.
Suppose, however, that the same taxpayer were insolvent after
transfer of the property. There is authority for the proposition that no
income arises from cancellation of the indebtedness when a continuing
state of insolvency prevents the debt cancellation from freeing any of
the taxpayer's assets from the burden of all obligations. 4  Yet, this
exception to Kirby Lumber should not affect the segment of the gain
which is due to the sale of the property.
In the first example above, cancellation of the debt segment of the
gain is only $10, the difference between the $90 value and $100 debt.
The other $10, the difference between the basis in the property and its
value, is gain from the sale of the property. This gain is probably not
exempt from taxation under the insolvency rule. In Parkford v. Com-
missioner Or the court held that a salary received by an individual ad-
91 See Lurie, Mortgagors with "Negative Equities" and "Negative Bases",
N.Y.U. 10th INST. ON FED. TAX. 71, 84 (1952) ; S. SupREY & W. WARREN, FEDERAL
INcomE TAXATION 843 (1960 ed.).
92 See, e.g., R. O'Dell & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1948);
Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 T.C. 682 (1943) ; cf. Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951).
'0 Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(b) (5) (1956) properly identifies the cancellation of debt
segment.
94Towers & Sullivan Mfg. Co., 25 B.T.A. 922 (1932); Eastside Mfg. Co., 18
B.T.A. 461 (1929); Simmons Gin Co., 16 B.T.A. 793 (1929), aff'd, 43 F.2d 327
(1930). But see Lakeland Grocery Co., 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937), in which the tax-
payer was insolvent prior to forgiveness of the debt and solvent thereafter.
0 133 F.2d 249 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943).
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judged bankrupt is taxable income. Similarly in Home Builders
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner,9 6 where an insolvent debtor realized gain
from the sale of certain installment contracts pledged as security for its
debts, the court held that the insolvency rule did not exempt from tax-
ation any gain from the sale.
Both the solvent and the insolvent may receive profits and be
liable for the tax thereon. It stands out clearly that when the
contracts were sold a profit . . . was realized, and it is im-
material whether or not the proceeds of the sale were sufficient
to pay the indebtedness of the taxpayer in full. The tax was
not on that part of its indebtedness which it may not have been
able to pay by reason of its alleged insolvency. No debt was
forgiven nor cancelled.
9 7
In both of these cases, the court distinguished gain arising from
the cancellation of a debt from gain attributable to a source unrelated
to debt cancellation. But in Main Properties, Inc. "8 the Tax Court
failed to make this distinction. There, the taxpayer conveyed real
estate which had an adjusted basis of approximately $212,000 and a
value of approximately $260,000 " in exchange for its own bonds with
a face value of $640,000. The court held that the entire gain was
exempt from tax under the insolvency exception to the Kirby Lumber
rule.' 0 Neither the Commissioner nor the court thought of treating
separately from the cancellation of indebtedness that portion of the gain
arising from the real estate sale ($48,000).' Although Main Prop-
erties did not involve mortgaged property, the situation was quite
similar to one involving property burdened by debt, since the taxpayer's
debt was discharged by conveyance of the property even though the
debt was not a specific lien thereon. If the taxpayer had sold the build-
ing for $260,000 and used this money to retire its debt, it would have
been compelled to take $48,000 into income under Home Builders
Lumber Co. Elimination of the middle step should not change the
result. If Home Builders is correct, then only the gain due to debt
cancellation should be exempt under the insolvency exception to Kirby
Lumber.
10 2
06 165 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1948).
97Id. at 1011.
984 T.C. 364 (1944).
99 Id. at 382.
100 Id. at 385.
101 Id. at 383.
102 Of course, if the taxpayer is at all times solvent, there is still a possibility
that he may not realize income from the cancellation of the debt, due to the reduc-
tion of purchase price doctrine. See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
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IV. APPLICATION OF Crane To TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY BY GIFT,
AT DEATH, AND ON ABANDONMENT
Commentators have been fearful that the Crane rule could be ex-
ploited either by the taxpayer or the Commissioner when the property
is disposed of other than through a sale. One writer feared that a gift
of the mortgaged property would not be a taxable event, with the result
that the taxpayer would never recognize the gain attributable to his
depreciation deductions, even though he could deduct the value of the
equity if the gift were to a charity.' 3 Others have thought that aban-
donment of mortgaged property to the mortgagee would not be a
taxable event."0 4 On the other hand, at least one writer found it "dif-
ficult to justify charging a gain to one who has merely surrendered
property that is worthless to him," even though he received depreciation
deductions without economic investment. 0 5 In the same vein, it has
been said that the idea of income resulting from abandonment "is like
saying that a casualty, such as a storm, which wipes out a taxpayer's
investment, may be productive of income." 106
The point that is being missed by those who criticize the application
of Crane to dispositions by abandonment is that there can be no invest-
ment in the property to the extent that the mortgage exceeds basis.
Where, under Crane, the mortgage is part of basis, the excess will
represent past deductions for depreciation in excess of taxpayer's own
investment. Where the mortgage is not part of basis, the excess will
represent money (or other property) received by borrowing on the
appreciation of the property. With this established, the discussion be-
low will show that the rule of Crane finding an amount realized in the
amount of the mortgage is properly applied to every disposition of
property, whether by way of abandonment, gift, or even transfer at death.
A. Disposition by Abandonment
The agonizing and persistent debate over whether Crane applies to
dispositions by abandonment was ended by Parker v. Delaney."T That
case held that Crane was applicable when the mortgagor abandoned
property to the mortgagee:
103 Lurie, Mortgagor's Gain on Mortgaging Property for More Than Cost With-
out Personal Liability, 6 TAX. L. REv. 319, 320 (1951).
104 This was the view that Judge Learned Hand expressed when Crane was
in the circuit court. Commissioner v. Crane, 153 F2d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'd
331 U.S. 1 (1947).
105 Note, Taxation of Gain Resulting From Sales of Mortgaged Property, 60
HAv. L. REv. 1324, 1329 n29 (1947).
10 6Lurie, Mortgagors With "Negative Equities" and "Negative Bases," N.Y.U.
10TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 71, 80 (1952).
107186 F2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950).
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[I]t does not help appellant [taxpayer] to term the trans-
action an abandonment if it was nevertheless a disposition
within the meaning of § 111 [§ 1001] upon which a gain was
realized . . . . In these circumstances, the unpaid amount of
the liens is carried forward, as it were, from the time of ac-
quisition to the time of disposition. They are treated as cost
at the earlier time and so must be treated as value at the later
time. The result in the end is that the taxpayer accounts to
the taxing authorities for the gain realized by his deductions
for depreciation in excess of his own investment. 08
B. Disposition by Gift
Once it is decided that the mortgage is part of the amount realized
when property is abandoned, the rationale applies with equal force to a
gift of mortgaged property, since a gift, at least in this context, is also
a disposition within section 1001. In a recent article,0 9 Nelson Adams
analyzes this problem by presenting the imaginary case of Blank v.
Commissioner, in which a taxpayer acquired an office building for
$100,000, subject to a $2,000,000 mortgage. He held the property for
5 years during which time he amortized $125,000 of the mortgage.
During this same period, he had net rental income of $100,000 before
depreciation, and took depreciation deductions of $525,000,10 $425,000
of which he applied against income from other sources. When he dis-
posed of the property by donating it to a tax exempt organization,
which took it subject to the unamortized mortgage of $1,875,000, the
taxpayer reported no income from the gift, but claimed a charitable de-
duction of $100,000 (the value of the equity).
The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's disallowance of the
charitable deduction on the ground that the property had no value in
excess of the mortgage. This point was not appealed by the taxpayer.
The Commissioner also contended that at the time of the gift the tax-
payer realized income in the amount of the excess of the mortgage,
$1,875,000, over his adjusted basis, $1,575,000. This $300,000 dis-
parity represented the difference between the taxpayer's investment of
$225,000 and the allowable depreciation of $525,000. Eventually, an
imaginary Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the lower courts'
holding that the taxpayer realized no income on the gift.
In the Supreme Court, the Commissioner argued that if basis
included the mortgage, then Crane required that the gift be treated as a
108 Id. at 459.
109 Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine; An Imaginary
Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAx L. IEv. 159 (1966).
110 The imaginary taxpayer used the straightline method of depreciation. Five




disposition upon which the amount of the mortgage is realized. Tax-
payer responded that Crane could not apply since "from time im-
memorial it has been the rule that income is not realized from a gift to
charity of property which has a value in excess of its adjusted basis." "'
The Court accepted the taxpayer's statement of the law in regard to
charitable contributions, but refused to apply it to him because he had
no equity in the transferred property. Absent some equity in the
property, the Court could not find any contribution. But even if an
equity were present, the rule preventing realization would not control
because it has been applied only to situations where the transferred
property was not encumbered by debt." Authority is abundant for
the proposition that absent a mortgage, a gift is not an event which
causes realization of gain." 3  The value of property in excess of its
basis, whether due to market appreciation or to the reduction of basis
by past deductions, is therefore not realized by a donor of the property." 4
ll Adams, supra note 109, at 167.
"2See L.O. 1118, 11-2 Cum. BULL. 148 (1923); Rev. Rul. 55410, 1955-1 Cum.
BusL.. 297; Rev. Rul. 57-328, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 229; Estate of Farrer, 15 T.C. 277
(1950) ; White v. Brodrick, 104 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1952) ; Campbell v. Prothro,
209 F2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Elsie SoRelle, 22 T.C. 459 (1954).
"13 See, e.g., Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F2d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1954).
114 The Commissioner acquiesced in Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 223,
225-26 and Rev. Rul. 55-531, 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 520. He ruled that the fair market
value of inventory property contributed to a charity is not includable in the donor's
income, and that such value is an allowable charitable deduction. Similarly, INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §§1245(b)(1), 1250(d)(1) exempt gifts from the recapture
provisions of those sections so that past depreciation will not be taxed on a gift of
depreciable property. However, on a gift of inventory there must be an adjustment
to remove the cost of the property from opening inventory in the year of the gift.
Similarly, current cost items applicable to the property are not deductible, and such
cost items deducted in past years must reduce the charitable contribution to avoid a
double deduction. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c) (1) (1958), and INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 170(e).
The cost and expense adjustments required by the Commissioner's rulings are
inconsistent with their underlying principle (and part of L.O. 1118, 11-2 Cum. BULL.
148 (1923)) that a gain is not realized on a gift even though the full value of the
property, including the untaxed excess of value over basis, qualifies for the charitable
deduction. Under this principle, the exclusion from income of market appreciation
allows a charitable deduction without a corresponding cost basis. Where the excess
of value over basis is caused by past deductions rather than market appreciation, a
symmetrical system would also allow the charitable deduction albeit there is no
cost basis.
For example, if real estate valued at $100 with a basis of $80 is donated to a
charity, the amount of the charitable contribution must be adjusted downward to $80
if the $20 by which value exceeds basis represents "additional depreciation" which
would have been taxed as ordinary income under § 1250 (a) had the property been
sold. See IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(e). (This is essentially the same as the
adjustments required by the above rulings, but here the adjustment is for past deprecia-
tion deductions rather than inventory and related costs.) It is clear that reduction
of the charitable deduction by $20 will increase taxable income by $20, which, in
essence is a recognition of the gain on the gift, a result thought to be prohibited by
the authorities. See note 112 supra.
It is true that in the language of the above rulings there is a "double deduction."
But the depreciation deduction for cost is simply a recovery of investment and puts
the donor of the property in the position of owning an asset in which, for tax
purposes, he has only a partial investment-the same as a donor who owns an asset
with unrealized market appreciation.
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In Blank, however, it was not the gift alone which caused realiza-
tion. The gain occurred because depreciation deductions were taken on
a basis which, because it included a mortgage, was in excess of the
taxpayer's investment in the property. The gift merely made the gain
due to such deductions sufficiently fixed and definite to impose a tax.
If realization did not occur at the time of the gift, it never would occur.
Viewed slightly differently, the transfer might not be called a
"gift" at all. It could be characterized as a sale (to which Crane clearly
applies) since there is no actual difference to the charity between ac-
cepting the property subject to the mortgage and buying the property
by taking title subject to the mortgage. Whether the mortgage is
treated as consideration for the sale of property or as a condition to a
gift, the result is identical. Under the analysis of Crane discussed
earlier, the amount of the mortgage can only be acquired by purchase
regardless of the form of the transaction. Thus, Crane should apply
at least up to the amount of the mortgage. The analysis would then be
clear: the transferor would "realize" the amount of the mortgage and
the transferee would have a basis of "cost" in such amount.
Nevertheless, the Court in the hypothetical Blank case stated that
the amount of the mortgage was realized only if the property was worth
not less than the amount of the mortgage."' Caught on the horns of
the dilemma of either giving the taxpayer a tax windfall where the
property is worth less than the amount of the mortgage, or repudiating
the reasoning in Crane that one who sells subject to a mortgage for
which he is not personally liable receives the benefit thereof, the Court
rejected Crane and held:
The same analysis applies to a charitable gift of inventory property. Deductions
attributable to the property should be disregarded on a gift to charity. If this seems
improper it is not because of the "double deduction" but because of a principle which
allows a deduction for market value without recognition of gain for appreciation in
the property. Although this principle has been modified by enactment of § 170 (e),
that modification does not reach gifts of inventory property.
115 See Adams, supra, note 108, at 169. The Court read Crane to mean that
when the value of the property fell below the amount of the mortgage, no amount
would be realized. This conclusion apparently follows from the Crane language
that "an owner of property, mortgaged at a figure less than that at which the property
will sell, must and will treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as if they were
his personal obligations." 331 U.S. at 14. In such case, the Blank court reasons
that relief from the mortgage on conveyance of the property gives a sense of per-
sonal relief from the debt. Conversely, if the property falls in value to an amount
less than the mortgage, the owner will not feel "personally" obligated, and relief
from the mortgage or conveyance of the property results in no benefit whatsoever.
This view of Crane places undue stress on the presence or absence of psychological
relief to the owner on being rid of the debt. Crane can be read, in a less extreme
manner, to mean that personal liability is simply a function of asset liability. Since
the owner's asset is subject to the mortgage, to that extent the owner is, in effect,
personally liable. On conveyance of the property subject to the mortgage, he is




[T]he taxpayer's economic benefit stems from the deductions
which we have allowed him to take on the unassumed mort-
gage. These deductions arose by reason of the tax law and
not because of what the taxpayer paid for the property.
Hence, when the property is disposed of-whether by sale,
abandonment, charitable gift, or otherwise-the tax law must
be interpreted as requiring the taxpayer to account for these
deductions."'
Implicit in this reasoning is a principle that gain due to past de-
preciation deductions is realized on any disposition of property, and
should therefore be taxed. Where the mortgage results from subse-
quent borrowing on the value of the property, gain on any disposition
of the property must also be realized, since the borrowing will represent
a recovery either of past investment or of market appreciation." 7
It should be noted that sections 1245 (b) (1) and 1250 (d) (1) pro-
vide explicitly that a gift is not a taxable event under sections 1245 (a)
and 1250(a), thus preventing recognition of ordinary income attrib-
utable to prior depreciation deductions, which might otherwise be re-
quired by those sections. But, as already discussed, to the extent of
any mortgage on the property, the transferee is a purchaser, not a
donee. Any transfer of section 1245 or section 1250 property should
therefore result in the same tax treatment as was given the property in
Blank. The reach of the "gift" exemption in these sections is no
greater than that in the cases relied upon by the taxpayer in Blank.
C. Mortgaged Property Passing at Death
The transfer of unencumbered property at death is not a taxable
event. The beneficiary of the property obtains a "stepped-up basis" "'
(the value of the property at the time of the grantor's death), in spite
of the fact that neither he nor the grantor has ever paid or will ever
pay tax on the property's appreciation while in the hands of the
grantor." 9 Although there appears to be no constitutional prohibition
on taxing these transactions, Congress has chosen not to do so.
120  If
114 Adams, supra note 109, at 169-70.
117 See, e.g., letter ruling from National Office, November 26, 1954, and letter
ruling from St. Paul District Director, December 1955 (RIA Fed. Tax Coordinator
f K3110); cf. Magnolia Dev. Corp., 19 CCH TAx CT. MEM. 934 (1960); Simon v.
Commissioner, 285 F.2d 422 (3d Cir. 1960).
118 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1014.
1) INxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a). But see, e.g., Tax Reform Studies and
Proposals of U.S. Treasury Department, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 28 (1969).
12 See Hearings on the President's 1963 Tax Message Before the House Commit-
tee on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 598; Campbell v. Prothro, 209
F2d 331, 336 (5th Cir 1954).
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the property is section 1245 or section 1250 property, a transfer thereof
by gift or at death does not invoke these sections.' 2 '
Thus, when unencumbered property is transferred at death, the
excess of the value of the property over decedent's basis therein escapes
income tax entirely, whether the excess is due to market appreciation,
or to decedent's depreciation deductions in excess of economic wear
and tear. The benefit accrues to the transferee of the property who can
recover the excess value free of tax, although no one ever had an
economic investment therein.
A different result is required, however, when the property is en-
cumbered with mortgage liability. Assume, for example, that when the
decedent died his property was subject to a mortgage of $500,000,
which was either the original "cost" of the property to the decedent,
or the product of subsequent borrowing. Further assume that the
decedent took the allowable depreciation deductions of $100,000 on an
original basis of $500,000, and the property was worth $500,000 at his
death. Under Crane, the basis to the beneficiary of the property is
$500,000, its full value undiminished by the mortgage. This is the
basis acquired under section 1014(a). But, as we have seen, the only
true value acquired by inheritance is the equity, here zero. The re-
mainder of the value of the physical property can only be acquired by
amortizing the mortgage, which has the effect of an installment pur-
chase and gives a cost basis."
Because the mortgage in this example is equal to the full value
of the property, no value passes to the beneficiary from the decedent.
All the beneficiary really inherits is a valueless option to buy the prop-
erty by amortizing the mortgage in the full amount of the property
value. Thus, the beneficiary's entire basis will be acquired by pur-
chase-it is the normal "cost" basis. This is important because it means
that no tax-free step-up in basis is given under sections 1014 and 102.
The presence of the mortgage requires the beneficiary to pay for the
value of the property. He does not acquire it free of cost or tax.
Indeed, the roles of the decedent and the beneficiary are somewhat re-
versed. Instead of the beneficiary obtaining the value of any apprecia-
tion which accrued to decedent, the decedent himself has "realized" the
121 See NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1245(b) (1), (2); id., § 1250(d) (1), (2).
But if the basis determined under § 1014(a) is required to be reduced under
§ 1014(b) (9) for the past depreciation taken by the beneficiary (e.g., where property
was held by the beneficiary as a tenant by the entirety with the decedent), the
regulations provide that the amount of the reduction is "additional depreciation"
under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1245 (a) (2), and all or part of the reduction may be
"additional depreciation" under § 1250(a), (b). Treas. Reg. § 1.12 45-2(c) (3) (1965).
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1250-3(b), 31 Fed. Reg. 6974 (1966).
12 2 Note that the beneficiary of encumbered property generally bears the burden
of the encumbrance. See, e.g., N.Y. ESTATE, POWNRS AND TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.6
(McKinney 1967); N.Y. Suaa. CT. PRoc. AcT, § 1811 (McKinney 1967).
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benefit of depreciation deductions without cost, or of borrowing on the
appreciation of the property. It is the beneficiary who must repay the
"cost" of these benefits by amortizing the mortgage. Therefore, the
decedent's gain should be taxed to his estate since the gain becomes
fixed when the property is disposed of at his death, and his interest will
no longer exist following the transfer.
To restate the proposition from an economic point of view, no
part of the property passes by inheritance. To the extent of the mort-
gage, the transaction is properly viewed as a sale to the beneficiary.
There is no difference between inheriting fully mortgaged property, and
purchasing it subject to the mortgage.
It is, of course, logical that sections 1245 (b) (2) and 1250(d) (2)
should no more exempt an inheritance of property subject to a mort-
gage that exceeds the decedent's basis I than they did a transfer of
similar property by gift. 2 '
V. CONCLUSION: SOME COMMENTS ABOUT TAx AVOIDANCE
Largely because of the rule established in Crane, depreciable real
estate offers an attractive "tax shelter." At the risk of a comparatively
small cash investment, the investor receives any profit or other benefits
that are the result of an increase in property value. In the interim be-
tween investment and appreciation not only can he use depreciation and
mortgage interest deductions to wipe out taxable rental income, but he
may also apply excess deductions against other income. If the property
appreciates, he may borrow on the appreciation by means of a mortgage
without personal liability. On any disposition of the property, he must
account (as income) for depreciation deductions in excess of invest-
ment and for any cash received for which he has no personal obligation
to repay. Although this requirement may compel him to include in
income the same number of tax-free dollars which he obtained by taking
the deductions or borrowing, the overall transaction may still give him
an unwarranted tax advantage.
His most important advantage is that the gain on the disposition
will generally be capital gain, 1 5 whereas past depreciation deductions
reduced ordinary income. This is true in spite of section 1250, which
taxes as ordinary income some part of the lower of gain or past de-
preciation deductions, since under that section no depreciation is taken
12 Note that §§ 1245(b) (2) and 1250(d) (2) exempt "a transfer at death," rather
than "property acquired by bequest, devise, or inheritance," as in § 1014(b) (1), or
"property acquired . . .by reason of death" in § 1014(b) (9). However, the meaning
appears to be the same. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-2(c) (3) (1965) ; Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 1.1250-3(b), 31 Fed. Reg. 6974 (1966).
124 Text following note 117 supra.
= See INT. REV. CoD or 1954, § 1231.
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into account for property held more than one year, except for de-
preciation deductions in excess of those allowable under the straight
line method.' 26 There is an obvious need for legislative tax reform
in this area. However, consideration should nevertheless be given to
a number of methods whereby this tax avoidance result can be mitigated.
A. Woodsam Associates, Inc.
As we have seen, Crane requires that the amount realized on a
disposition of property include the amount of any mortgage on the
property, irrespective of whether there is personal liability thereon.
When the mortgage is due to borrowing on the appreciation of the
property subsequent to its purchase, the taxpayer is accountable for the
cash obtained by borrowing. The effect is to allow a taxpayer to
liquidate his investment, thereby assuring himself of any gain from
property appreciation which would increase the amount of cash re-
ceived by borrowing. When there is no personal liability should such
gain be recognized and taxed on the borrowing, rather than on a subse-
quent disposition?
This issue arose in Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner.rn
Mrs. Wood acquired certain real property for $300,000, depreciated it
down to $250,000, and then obtained a loan of $400,000 without per-
sonal liability, secured by a mortgage on the property. The property
was later transferred to the taxpayer corporation in exchange for its
stock in a tax-free exchange under the predecessor of section 351 of the
Code. At this time, the provisions of section 357(c),128 which would
have taxed her on the excess of the mortgage over her basis at the time
of the transfer to the corporation, had not been enacted. Mrs. Wood
therefore recognized no gain on the transfer to the corporation. The
corporation argued, however, that she should have recognized the gain
when she borrowed the $400,000 since at that time she had obtained
$150,000 without any liability to repay it. If the corporation had pre-
vailed, her basis in the property would have been increased by $150,000,
and this stepped-up basis would have become the basis for the cor-
poration under the provisions of what is now section 362(a). But
the court rejected the corporation's argument and held that under the
predecessor of section 1001 (a) the borrowing was not a taxable dis-
position of property. To support its decision the court explained that
Mrs. Wood did not close the transaction since she had not finally re-
linquished the property. She could collect the rents and borrow more
12 6 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1250(b) (1).
127 198 F2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
328 This section was new to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
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on the property, if this was possible. 2 9 In other words, the court
emphasized that she still had an economic interest in the property.
The court also noted that a mortgagee is a creditor of the bor-
rower even in the absence of personal liability on the mortgage, albeit
nothing more than a preferred creditor. 30 Here the court seems to be
saying that the only real effect of personal liability is to subject all of
one's assets to the claim of the creditor. When there is no personal
liability, but the creditor's claim is a lien on an asset of the taxpayer
which is of sufficient value to satisfy the claim, this is tantamount to
personal liability. Thus, "mortgaging out" was not a final disposition
of the property. No gain was realized because of Mrs. Wood's con-
tinuing economic interest in the property, and also because any gain
was offset by the obligation to repay the loan.'
It has been argued that a mortgage in excess of cost without per-
sonal liability should be treated as a sale of a lien upon the property,
and that it should be a taxable event because the mortgagor can keep
all profit without restriction. The absence of liability guarantees that
the profit made will not be lost.' Although the taxpayer has a con-
tinuing economic interest in the property, his interest is relinquished in
the amount of the mortgage, and to this extent, there is a "disposition"
of the property.
This argument is a persuasive refutation of Woodsam. Its pri-
mary advantage lies in the fact that there is no deferral of the tax.
Current collection is favored for many reasons, not the least of which
is the assurance of a solvent taxpayer. If the gain is taxed currently
the amount of gain recognized is added to the basis of the property so
that upon a later sale of the property that amount would offset inclusion
of the mortgage in the amount realized and the same gain will not be
taxed again. This gain also becomes part of the basis for depreciation.' 3
Not only is this argument intriguing, it also embraces a justi-
fiable notion of realization, since the gain is sufficiently fixed and definite
to be taxed, in light of the taxpayer's ability to prevent a loss. How-
ever, the practical consequences of this treatment should not be over-
looked. In many, if not most cases, the taxpayer will repay the loan.
m 198 F2d at 359.
130 Id.
131 See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 313 (1961) ; Commissioner v.
Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 408 (1946); Resthaven Mem. Cemetery, Inc., 43 B.T.A.
683 (1941) (repurchase option defeated by occurrence of an event outside of the
seller's control). See also Marion A. Blake, 8 T.C. 546 (1947) (conveyance with
retained option to repurchase held not to be a sale).
132 Lurie, Mortgagors Gain on Mortgaging Property For More Than Cost
Without Personal Liability (Contentions of Taxpayer's Counsel in A Pending Case),
6 TAx. L. REv. 319, 322, 325 (1951).
133 Id. 326-27.
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Do we then "unwind" the transaction and give the taxpayer a deduc-
tion for the repayment, and a corresponding reduction in the basis of
the property? How to treat this transaction is the converse problem
of how to treat a tax benefit-perhaps we should call it a "tax detri-
ment." It includes subsidiary problems of bunching, tax rate differ-
entials, and depreciation adjustments. For example, any deduction for
repayment may have to be reduced by the amount of depreciation al-
ready taken.
Alternatively, the repayment could be viewed as a reinvestment in
the property. If the borrowing is treated as a sale of the property,
then the repayment can be treated as a repurchase. The property
would keep its stepped-up basis, and past depreciation thereon would
cause no problem. But under this approach, the taxpayer will have
acquired, in effect, a stepped-up basis for gain which, if viewed with
hindsight, is unrealized in any but the most legalistic sense.
Moreover, although deferral of tax is avoided, the major objection
to Crane-the capacity to obtain depreciation deductions in excess of
investment, at capital gains cost-is not removed. Even more im-
portant, if borrowing on appreciation is treated as a taxable disposition,
how will the taxpayer who simply buys property subject to a mortgage
without personal liability be treated? For example, suppose a taxpayer
buys property subject to a mortgage of $100 without personal liability
and depreciates the property on a basis of $100 down to zero. He is
in exactly the same position as another taxpayer who buys for $100
cash, depreciates on a basis of $100 down to zero, and later borrows
$100 on the property without personal liability. If the latter has
recognized gain on the borrowing, so has the former, who recognizes
it as he depreciates. The real gain for each of them is the depreciation
allowed without economic investment in the property. Thus the effect
of a rule treating mortgaging out as a disposition is denial of deprecia-
tion entirely to one who buys property on credit.
B. Depreciation Adjustment Limited to Investment
Another suggestion for preventing tax avoidance through de-
preciation deductions is limiting the depreciation allowance to the
owner's net investment in the property (investment less depreciation).
At the same time, the amount of the deduction could be calculated on
the sum of the original investment and the amount of the mortgage.
3 4
134 See, e.g., Rusoff, The Federal Income Tax Consequences of Transactions
Relating to Mortgages on Land, 4 BUFFALO L. REv. 181, 196 (1955); Note, Tax
Consequences of the Disposition of Property Subject to An Unassoned Mortgage,
49 COLUm. L. REv. 845, 851 (1949); Comment, Depreciation of Property Subject To




Following any initial deductions, depreciation allowances would cease
unless the down payment, together with amortization payments on the
mortgage, kept pace with depreciation deductions. Of course, the
mortgage would be included in neither basis nor amount realized on
disposition of the property.'35
The advantage of this proposal is that it avoids the problem of
computing depreciation on a shifting equity, a concept which would
cause substantial inconvenience for both the taxpayer and the Com-
missioner, and which would tend to distort income by bunching de-
preciation deductions toward the end of the property's useful life. But
this proposal is dependent on the initial investment plus amortization
payments always being at least equal to the sum of past depreciation
allowed and the current depreciation deduction. In cases where there
is a small down payment and current payments in large part represent
interest, even this proposal may involve problems of shifting equity,
especially if the depreciation is accelerated. 36
C. Tax Avoidance Motive
A third solution to the problem is exclusion from basis of the
amount of the unassumed mortgage when it is in excess of the value of
the property. 37 This exclusion is based on the presumption that where
the amount of the mortgage exceeds the value of the property-contrary
to the reasoning of Crane-the taxpayer will not amortize the mort-
gage. This presumption is reasonable, since amortization payments in
the difference between the value of the property and the mortgage will
be wasted unless the property increases in value to make up the dif-
ference. A related ground for denial of depreciation is the "purposeless
activity" rationale of Goldstein v. Commissioner,3 ' which denies a
deduction where the taxpayer has no reason to engage in a transaction
except to secure the deduction.' 9
The difficulty with both of these approaches is proof of the op-
erative facts. Problems of valuation are susceptible to proof, but are
nevertheless difficult. The difficulty is compounded if the value of the
property fluctuates during the time it is owned by the mortgagor. In
a close case, a taxpayer who makes the initial determination in a self-
assessment system will have little difficulty finding an expert to resolve
135 Note, Tax Consequences of the Disposition of Property Subject to an Un-
assumed Mortgage, 49 CoLum. L. REv. 845, 851 n.46 (1949).
136 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(c).
137 See, e.g., Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine; An
Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAx L. REv. 159, 165 (1966).
138 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966).
139 See also, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) ; cases discussed
in Adams, supra note 137, at 166 n.10.
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any doubts about value in his favor. The Goldstein test-whether an
activity is "purposive" or "purposeless"-is not designed to calm the
waters of tax controversy, and may raise as many questions as it
answers. This is especially true when the purchaser of real estate at-
tempts to salvage the property and restore its market value-an attempt
which he would not make if he had to assume personal liability on the
mortgage. Surely, this activity has a purpose beyond acquiring tax
deductions. Mayerson'4 ° was such a case. There the taxpayer
acquired an older piece of property with the intent to remodel it and
enhance its profit potential."4 Because of the building's age, poor con-
dition, and municipal orders outstanding against it, conventional
financing was unavailable. The taxpayer purchased the building by
giving a purchase money note without personal liability, no portion of
which (except for $10,000) was due for 99 years. Within a few years,
he had so improved the property's earning power that he was able to
retire the 99 year mortgage and obtain conventional financing at a much
reduced price.'42 It may have appeared to the Commissioner that the
taxpayer was doing no more than buying huge depreciation deductions
for only $10,000. But it turned out after all that he had a legitimate
economic purpose. Such activity should not be discouraged.
Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Service, in announcing acqui-
escence in Mayerson stressed that there was present "a bona fide sale
• consummated at arm's length between knowledgeable strangers,
for valid business purposes, and that a bona fide debt obligation for
most of the purchase price had been created." '" The Service also
"noted that the fair market value of the property was not put in issue in
the case . . . and that it would "continue to review transactions . . .
designed to improperly create or inflate depreciation deductions . "
and would "disallow unwarranted depreciation deductions." '44
The fair market value of the property was not in issue, but a
substantial price reduction was provided if the mortgage was paid
within the first two succeeding years. Five years after the purchase,
when the taxpayer had so improved the property that he could get con-
ventional financing, he settled the $332,500 mortgage note for
$200,000.',' The discount did not seem to represent the interest
element since the mortgage bore interest at 6 per cent.148 Thus, fair
140 47 T.C. 340 (1966).
141 Id. at 341.
142 Id. at 345-46.
143 Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 8, at 10.
144 Id.
145 47 T.C. at 346.
146 Id. at 342.
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market value perhaps should have been an issue in Mayerson. In any
case, the taxpayer had a business purpose for the purchase, and was
not merely buying depreciation deductions.
D. Taxing Gain as Ordinary Income
A final solution to the problems posed in Crane is to disallow as
part of basis any mortgage for which there is no personal liability, re-
gardless of the value of the property. Such a blanket approach would
guarantee that depreciation deductions would not exceed investment,
but serious objections to this solution are easily discernible. First, the
problem of depreciation deductions in excess of investment can arise
even when there is personal liability on the mortgage, especially where
accelerated depreciation is present or where the mortgage does not re-
quire amortization for a long period, as in Mayerson. Although the
presence of personal liability is some evidence that tax avoidance is not
the motive of the transaction, it does not prevent depreciation deductions
in excess of investment, which are taken against ordinary income and
repaid at capital gains rates. This problem is broader than that raised
by Crane, and Congress has attempted a solution of it on a broader
level. 47
A second objection is derived from the language of the Court in
Crane-a shifting equity would be created and income distorted as a
result of depreciation deductions which increase, inversely to the usual
rate of exhaustion, 48 in the later years of a property's useful life. One
who takes property subject to a mortgage may be placed at a dis-
advantage as compared to one who assumes personal liability, a result
that may be inappropriate if an investment will eventually be made in
the property. As already noted, amortization could be allowed on a
basis including only that part of the mortgage equal to the actual invest-
ment. This is probably the best solution, but its adoption is unlikely
in light of Crane.
However, there is a solution that both accommodates the principle
of Crane regarding basis, and still treats the gain realized on the dis-
position of the property as ordinary income. This solution is to ignore
the Crane doctrine that the mortgage is realized on a disposition. In-
stead, gain resulting from depreciation in excess of investment would be
viewed as arising from the depreciation rather than from the disposition.
This was the basic approach of the imaginary Supreme Court in the
nonexistent case of Blank v. Commissioner."4  Underlying this ap-
proach is the concept that the gain actually occurs when the taxpayer
147 See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1239, 1245, 1250.
' 48 See Adams, supra note 137, at 174.
-49 Id. 169.
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deducts more than his investment, thereby removing from taxable in-
come the income which would otherwise be taxed at ordinary rates.
The disposition of the property, whether it be by sale or otherwise,
simply marks a definite time (the last feasible time) for the deferred
taxation of this income. Any possibility of treating the transaction as
a sale or exchange to invoke capital gains treatment is destroyed. 50
Conceptually, this may be treated as an application of the tax benefit
principle of section 111 which requires inclusion in a taxpayer's income
of a "recovery" of a past deduction which has given him a tax benefit.
Such a result is similar to that in West Seattle National Bank v. Com-
missioner,'5 ' where the amount of a bad debt reserve was held to be
ordinary income when the taxpayer sold its accounts receivable at face
value pursuant to section 337. The bad debt reserve, the court held,
"represents income earned in the past which has escaped taxation." 152
Thus when the liquidating corporation sold its assets, the gain due to
the reserve was not entitled to the exemption from tax given by section
337. In other words, the court treated the gain not as arising from the
sale of accounts receivable, but as resulting from a prior deduction
which gave tax benefit. 5
There is no inconsistency between this analysis and Crane. The
Crane court itself noted that the "crux of this case, really, is whether
the law permits her [the taxpayer] to exclude allowable deductions
from consideration in computing gain." " Upon reconsideration, the
Crane requirement that the mortgage be included in amount realized
appears to be a clumsy application of the tax benefit principle-clumsy,
because it looks not to the deductions which gave the tax benefit, but
(because of section 1016) to allowable deductions for depreciation,
whether or not they were of tax benefit. Furthermore, in its failure to
distinguish the various elements of gain, the Crane doctrine treats the
entire gain as realized on a sale, rather than as a recovery of prior
deductions, resulting in possible capital gains treatment for the entire
amount.
150 See, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201, 1202, 1221, 1222. There are certain
dispositions of property which may not be treated as a sale or exchange anyway, such
as abandonment of the property. See, e.g., Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951) ; cases discussed in Rusoff, The Federal
Income Tax Consequences of Transactions Relating to Mortgages on Land, 4 BuFFAio
L. REv. 181, 209-214 (1955). But see Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F2d 125 (2d Cir.
1962) ; Commissioner v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963).
151 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961).
'5
2 Id. at 49.
153 Accord Rev. Rul. 62-128, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 139; cf. Estate of Schmidt v.
Commissioner, 355 F2d 111 (9th Cir. 1966). See also INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1245,
1250, which treat amounts deducted in the past for depreciation as income at disposi-
tion, although the disposition does not involve a sale, and is not otherwise a taxable
event (e.g., a corporate liquidation under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 336).
154 331 U.S. at 15 (footnotes omitted).
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Although the proposed solution is not inconsistent with Crane,
it is apparently precluded by the provisions of section 1231. This
section normally treats gain from the sale of depreciable property used
in the trade or business as capital gain. Its effect is to remove "re-
covery" of past depreciation deductions from the tax benefit principles
of section 111 "' (under which such a recovery would presumably get
ordinary income treatment) and to treat the recovery as gain from the
sale of a capital asset.
Disposition may be by other means than by sale-by abandonment
or by gift, for example-but, as already noted, to the extent the prop-
erty is subject to a mortgage, any disposition is really a sale. In any
event, tax consequences should not be dependent upon a strict con-
struction of the term "sale," if there has been a disposition of the
property with concomitant termination of the taxpayer's interest." 6 A
taxpayer bent on exploiting Crane will have no trouble achieving a sale.
The problems raised by Crane cannot be solved in a vacuum. In
order to resolve some of the questions presented herein, section 1231
(as well as the sections relating to basis, gain, and amount realized) will
have to be reexamined. Congressional attempts to modify its effect,
evidenced by sections 1239, 1245, and 1250, have been largely ineffec-
tive. If we are to achieve a consistent, fair tax policy for inclusion of
unassumed mortgage liability in basis, depreciation of the excess of un-
assumed liability over investment, and taxation of depreciation recovery,
legislative reform is needed. Congress must reconsider the problems in
light of past abuses, with the knowledge that taxpayers will do every-
thing possible to transform ordinary income into capital gains.
1'-5See Treas. Reg. §1.111-1 (a) (1956), which removes depreciation from the
coverage of § 111.
3,56 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963);
Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
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